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THE NEW REALITY IN CANADA/U.S. RELATIONS:
RECONCILING SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND
THE "SMART BORDER DECLARATION"
Stephen E. Flynnt
U.S. Speaker
Good morning everyone. I am honored to be here today talking about this
very vital issue. I am sorry I am not Tom Ridge, but I will try to give you my
tour de force on these issues. They certainly have raised to the forefront the
critical topic of this conference: how do we sustain this relationship in the
context of a new threat environment?
I want to make three points today. There is still a security imperative.
That is why advancing security has been a part of our matrix. Secondly,
this is not a trade-off issue. It is not a balancing act. Advancing security
and the economic integration must be done concurrently or it is self-defeating
for both missions. I would also like to throw out at you some next
steps; how we advance this actual agenda.
SECURITY IMPERATIVE
I am going to begin with the security imperative. I started this enterprise
working with the Hart/Rudman Commission.' The Hart/Rudman
Commission, co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman,
was actually the brainchild of the former Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich. He pigeon holed President Clinton one day and said, "You know,
I Stephen E. Flynn is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow, National Security Studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Flynn, served as a consultant on homeland security for
the Hart-Rudman Commission; was director of the Office of Global Issues at the National
Security Council; served as an associate professor at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy; and was
a Guest Scholar and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. In 2002, Dr. Flynn was
appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Science and Technology for
Countering Terrorism in Transportation and Distribution Systems. He is the recipient of many
honors and fellowships, including the Legion of Merit, the Coast Guard Academy
Distinguished Alumni Achievement Award, and an International Affairs Fellowship from the
Council on Foreign Relations.
1 Hart/Rudman Commission, also known as the National Security Study's Senior
Advisory Board, was recently renamed the U.S. Commission on National Security/2 1st
Century (USCNS/21). USCNS/21 operates as a Federal advisory committee. See USCNS/21
Charter available at www.nssg.gov/AboutUs/Charter/charter.htm.
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nobody has really looked at the national security establishment that we
created in 1947 since 1947. The world seems to have changed somewhat
since then. Maybe we should do kind of a reassessment." A radical idea.
They actually appropriated money to run a three-year project. It was a very
blue ribbon commission with a very substantial staff behind it. 2 The
commission was designed to do essentially three things: look at the threat
environment, articulate what the strategy should be, and identify what
changes would have to happen to execute that strategy.
What was extraordinary with this group of veteran cold warriors by in
large, was the way in which they went about actually getting their sense of
what the threat was. They arranged a lot of field trips. They were
extraordinarily struck by the depth of the anti-Americanism they came
across. It really surprised them. They consistently found that there was a real
general angst out there with regard to the United States and its place in this
new world.
In that context, they basically started to realize that the new threat
environment was not a re-emerging China or similar kind of scenario that
makes those at the Department of Defense feel much more comfortable
because that is what they are geared to do. It was a new threat environment.
In 1999, they reached the conclusion that the number one imperative for the
new century is likely to be a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil. They
also found that we are not fundamentally structured to deal with that type of
attack.
What they ended up doing was making a recommendation that dealt with
the issue of looking at where these guys are coming from. We built the
national security establishment that we have, essentially for an away game.
Literally, waters edge out. You cannot do much inside the territorial sea
inland with the national security apparatus we have.
What are these adversaries likely to do? They seem to be interested in
home games, not just away ones. In that context, how are we situated? For
folks who always have their eyes geared to deal with problems out there,
when they suddenly swept their field of vision into what looked like the
domestic security terror fervor of the United States they were horrified. We
do not do a lot of this. Increasingly, it was sort of the bargain that we made
with ourselves post World War II. Americans said as a society we are willing
to invest trillions of dollars in a peace time or non-active war environment to
do that over there, because we do not want a whole lot of this stuff in our
neighborhood. That worked quite well throughout that period of time, but
here we are.

2

Full list of commissioners availableat www.nssg.gov/AboutUs/People/people.htm.
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In July 2001, they rolled out the final recommendations 3 in the Mansfield
Room on the Senate side of the Capital. Ten of the fourteen Commissioners
basically made this overarching series of recommendations built around this
analysis. No major media outlet showed up to cover it, just a few beltway
bandit types that write up these inside commission sort of stories were there.
Senator Hart and Rudman were a little frustrated by this. They wrote a piece
and sent it to the New York Times. They said, no thanks.
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
On September 12th the long editorial in the New York Times refers to the
Hart/Rudman Report.4 Let me read it here "We found ourselves in a changed
world." Now, what is the threat? I would suggest very strongly that we are
already seeing this notion of a duplicate challenge - even without the 9-11
attack. There is real anti-American angst out there that exists for a variety of
reasons. The United States is effectively a status quo power. It is a dominant
military and cultural economic power almost by definition. Given that the
world is working pretty well from its standpoint, if you are somebody out
there on the planet that is unhappy with that status quo, then you are
increasingly likely to be anti-American.
We are seen as the owner of the
status quo, so we are the target.
The United States is spending more on national security and the
traditional national security apparatus,6 even before we pick up the tab for
war, than the rest of world combined.7 If you take on the United States in the
3 The United States Commission on National Security/2 1st Century, Road Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change, Feb. 15, 2001, available at www.nssg.gov/
PhasellFR.pdf.
4 "While the United States must retain its conventional and nuclear war-fighting
machinery, the government needs to consider a reallocation of resources to homeland defenses
against unorthodox threats. That was the largely ignored recommendation of a national
commission headed by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman that early this year
noted that the relative invulnerability of the nation to catastrophic attack could soon end
because of terrorist threats." The War Against America; The National Defense, N.Y.TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2001, at A 26.
5 Stephanie R. Nicolas, Negotiating in the Shadow of Outlaws: A Problem-Solving
Paradigmfor Unconventional Opponents, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 385 (2000); See also,
New Kind of War for U.S, L. A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1998, at B4; The New Terrorism,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998, at 19; Bradley Graham, Pentagon Plans Domestic Terrorism
Team, WASH POST, Feb. 1, 1999, at A2; Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 75, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 29-30.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2003: Budget of the U.S.
Government, availableat www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/budget.pdf
7 The President's request for an increase of $48 billion in the defense budget, expected to
reach $379 billion in 2003. For the next five years, President Bush demands an increase of
$120 billion, which would raise the total defense budget to $451 billion. This proposal
6
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traditional way, it looks a lot like what has happened to Saddam Hussein in
the last three weeks8 or what happened to the Taliban 9. If you imagine
yourself potentially at war with the United States, either because your back is
against the wall or you have proactively taken a strike at this great monolith,
you similarly cannot be thinking in traditional military terms. At least it is
imprudent for us to imagine that is what a potential adversary would be
doing, particularly since they now have the example of 9-11.
Two things with that example: first of all we are wide open and secondly,
you can generate profound disruption by engaging in this as a means of
warfare. Given that context, they can generate profound disruption.
Catastrophic terrorism has real military value at a relatively low-cost
evolution; striking at critical infrastructure leads to what we had right after
9-11. The imposition of something like an economic blockade in our own
economy has real military value. As long as there is an incentive to do that
or there is at least that promise, this warfare will continue to be attractive.
And, that, I believe, is where we are today.
What is clear is that the occupation of Iraq is going to get very ugly. The
recruits for this view of anti-Americanism are not going to go away. In the
world we are in, you do not have to be a state to sponsor this level of lethal
warfare. You can be a non-state actor. When there is a world of arms
bazaars out there, 10 which there is, you can have access to carrying out these
kinds of horrific acts. That is the reality that confronts us. From a security
imperative, it still persists and may even be exacerbated over the near to
medium term. Going to the source of Al Queda or taking out Iraq may
displace one particular adversary, but there are many variables out there.

includes $19.4 billion for the global war against terrorism, costing $1.8 billion per month, the
largest increase in defense spending since the Reagan era and equivalent to 40% of the world's
total military expenditures. Luis Mesa Delmonte, Economic Sanctions, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign
Policy, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345, 371 (2001); Global military spending now
exceeds $800 billion a year. Stalled Global Disarmament Efforts, Terrorist
Use of Mass Destruction Weapons - Backdrop for Disarmament Debate Beginning 30
September, United Nations, Press Release, GA/DIS/3222, Sept. 27, 2002, available at
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GADIS3222.doc.htm.
8 Sean Loughlin, U.S. moving 'at will' in Baghdad,CNN.com, April 9, 2003, availableat
www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/08/sprj.irq.pentagon/index.html.
9 U.S. announces the Taliban no longer control any territory within Afghanistan. 67 FED.
REG. No. 19 at 4301, Dept. of State Public Notice 3899, Jan. 29, 2002, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002-register&docid=02-2244filed.
10 Steve Bowman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat, CONG. RES. SERV.
REP. FOR CONGRESS RL31332, March 7, 2002, available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organizationI9184.pdf; See also Steve Bowman and Helit Barel, Weapons of Mass
Destruction- The Terrorist Threat, CONG. RES. SERv. REP. FOR CONGRESS, RS20412, Dec. 8

1999, available at www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS20412.pdf
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Unless we deny the fact that this type of warfare has simply gone away, the
nature of warfare is such that I suspect that we have to plan accordingly.
BALANCING THE ISSUES
Why is it that you get such big bang for your buck? This is the trade-off
issue I mentioned earlier. The big bang for your buck arises from a
fundamental reality of terrorism as a means of warfare vis a' vi what our
governments are primarily equipped to deal with in terms of these agencies
that we are drawing on with regard to dealing with accidents or crime.
Generally, when we have incidents of crime or particularly in terms of
accidents, things blowing up, refineries blowing up because of mechanical
failure, the general public response is almost always "those poor unlucky
devils, they were in the wrong place at the wrong time." The view is always,
it is an isolated event. Even those in the public policy community say, "That
event highlighted a systemic weakness, a challenge that we as a community
must address because you too could be unlucky like those folks if we do not
deal with these issues." It takes a substantial effort, sometimes many years,
to build the corrective to that sense of what systemic vulnerability is.
I point to not just the 9-11 attack and what it did to aviation, but also
anthrax and what it did to mail,' 'and especially the Washington area sniper
incident of this past fall' 2 to illustrate a key difference with regard to these
terror acts and what issues it presents for government. The difference is
when these acts take place the presumption for the public is almost the exact
opposite of what I just laid out. The presumption is a generalized
vulnerability, unless you can prove otherwise.
By any cold risk analysis, if you are one of the 2.5 million people in the
greater Washington area, and there is one loan gunman taking pops at people
at the rate of one a day, the odds of you being that one person shot when you
are pumping gas are much less than the morbidity rate of simply getting in
your car and driving on the beltway. Surely people will be quite rational
about this and recognize their odds are really quite good that they can get
their gas safely as opposed to the morbidity of driving in traffic. They see
evidence of fatal accidents everyday when they are driving on the beltway.
They do not change their behavior. But they did when the sniper was active.
There is a disconnect here.
If we had not caught the sniper before the election, it could have affected
democracy. People might not have come out of their houses to vote. The
problem became that people assumed a generalized vulnerability because of
1 Tony Pugh, Postal Service Wants at Least $3 Billion to Sanitize American Mail, Trib.
Bus. News, Nov. 28, 2001.
12 Guy Taylor, Maryland killing disrupts return to normality, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002.
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a lack of capacity to provide reassurance given the uncertainty of the
environment. That becomes the problem with regard to things like the border
when you factor in things like surface transportation, whether it is a ship, a
container, a truck, or rail car. One incident of a box blowing up in Detroit
resulting in thousands of lives lost raises the questions, "What about all the
rest of the boxes? What risk management tool is out there to manage that?"
When the answer is, as it allegedly is right now, anybody in the planet
with $1,600 in Asia, $1,000 in Europe, with up to 30 tons of merchandise can
order one up, have it sent to their house or workplace, load it to the gills,
close the doors, put a 50 cent seal on it, and send it off to the races but trust
me, most people do not want to blow you up. I suspect that the response is
going to be very different from what the public sector is going to say. The
public response is "keep the switch on, make it keep going, because it does
not happen too often."
As for the incapacity to demonstrate a credible ability to manage this risk
because of an insufficient baseline, I would suggest we need security in the
systems to validate low risk as low risk. Not being able to identify and
intercept high risk containers will lead to a general collapse of confidence
that will impact for some time the ability for this vital sector to get restarted
and continue moving forward. Look at what happened after 9-11. We
grounded all aviation.' 3 We went through every airplane to verify there were
no terrorists or means of terrorism. That took three days.' 4 How long does it
take to do trucks, trains and ships? A lot longer.
The economic implication of the lack of security in the system is pretty
self-evident. Ninety percent of the world's general cargo moves in boxes. If
we have to turn it off, even for a little while, it can be devastating. We
already have an example of this. The ten-day lockout on the labor dispute
this past fall. It took three months just to restart just the mechanics of the
system. Somewhere between $30 and 40 billion is the estimate of the cost to
the economy.' 5 Try to not only turn it on mechanically, but restore public
confidence at the same time and we have a much greater problem.
13 In response to the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. takeoffs

from all domestic airports were blocked by the Federal Aviation Administration at 9:25 a.m.
on Tuesday, September I 1th. Raju Chebium, Nation's Transportation Comes to a Halt,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 11, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 5112550.
14 Katie Fairbank, U.S. Airlines Return to the Skies in Small Numbers, TRIB. Bus. NEWS,
Sept. 14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27176303

Pacific Maritime Association, whose members include shipping lines, terminal operators
and stevedoring services, estimated the toll of the of a five to ten day management lockout of
West coast dock workers on the U.S. economy will reach $19.4 billion. Evelyn Iritani and

Maria Dickerson, Tallying Port Dispute's Costs Many Companies Managed to Escape Major
Losses, but Some Negative Effects Could be Permanent, L. A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002. at C l,
available at 2002 WL 103220071.
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Let me go to the other side of the coin. That efficiency, that is not
promoting efficiency, undermines security. I am not doing this in the
broader macro argument that power in the United States is a result of our
economic prosperity and therefore provides resources and so forth. I make it
from purely a security case. A hardened security response, a single point
security approach, like we have done on the Southwest border over the
course of the decade of the 1990's leads to a more insecure environment. It is
a less policeable environment. It creates a chaotic, fragmented market
response making it almost impossible to do effective risk management. You
could not design a better system for organized crime than the one we have
operating in Laredo, Texas to protect the border.
How does it work? It basically works this way. If you have a quarter
million dollar rig, you are not going to waste your resources having it wait
six hours just to travel 20 miles across the border and then come back across
empty. So how does the market respond? The market responds by having
long-haul trucks that ship stuff down to Monterrey arriving in North
Laredo.16 The trucks put their loads in a North Laredo depot, then have that
depot contact a Mexican broker who is going to pick up the box with a short
haul drayage to bring it to the broker. The broker verifies the Mexican duties
are paid. Once that is done they call another short-haul truck to pick up the
load then wait in the depot to get across the border and drop it off in northern
Laredo at which point7 a Mexican long-haul can pick it up at that depot and
take it to the interior.1
16

The size of Laredo's transportation services industry can be credited to the extensive

truck traffic through the city evident by the $30 billion in U.S. exports and $35 billion in U.S.
imports that flowed through Laredo in 1999. This same year the city accounted for
approximately 39 percent of the volume and 50 percent of the value of all land-transported
trade between the U.S. and Mexico. Keith Philips and Carlos Manzanares, Transportation
Infrastructureand the Border Economy, THE BORDER ECONOMY, at 2, June 2001, available at
www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/border/tbephillips.pdf
17 "The destination of southbound shipments through Laredo also has increased the size of
its transportation services industry. Non-maquiladora shipments-which represent a greater
share of the Laredo traffic than at other border ports-are subject to greater tariff restrictions
and thus require more paperwork and inspection. This delay at the border creates a market for
short-haulers, as it is not efficient for long-haul truckers to wait for the extra inspections and
paperwork to be completed. Many maquiladora plants close to the border use their own trucks
to haul products to and from warehouses on the U.S. side. Additional freight-forwarding and
transportation services jobs in Laredo result from the practices of Mexican customs brokers,
who must preclear all truck cargo before it crosses into Mexico. Trucks are cleared on the U.S.
side partly because warehouse and truck terminal space is lacking in Nuevo Laredo, on the
Mexican side. U.S. long-haul carriers typically drop their cargo at a company warehouse in
Laredo. A freight-forwarding company picks up the cargo and takes it to a Mexican customs
broker's warehouse in Laredo. The customs broker inspects it, collects duties and arranges for
another freight-forwarding truck to transport the load across the bridge. The freight-forwarder
then returns to Laredo, usually empty. Thus, the abundance of trucks passing through Laredo,
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There is a 300 percent turnover rate per year on short-haul drayage
companies. They are often mom and pops that have two or three trucks in
their inventory. This is where old trucks go before they die. If you look at it
right at the border you will say this is lawless. We have got to rein this thing
in. We have to harden this border. As we make it more costly to get across
the border more incentives for corruption are created. More sophisticated
criminal networks develop to help the immigrants get across the border. The
core argument here is that more inefficient security measures create a chaotic
market response and ultimately a more insecure environment to police. The
corollary then becomes the more efficient the environment, if there is
sufficient transparency and accountability in it, the more it supports risk
management that actually enhances security.
We have a security rationale to improve the infrastructure at our borders
that makes no commercial sense because it creates congestion. We have an
incentive to improve the regulatory behavior at agencies acting at the border
that makes no commercial sense. These guys surely could create some
one-stop shopping systems instead of the chaos that is operating on the
regulatory side. You have a security rationale similar to Eisenhower building
the highway system on a national globalization rationale that had all the
economic benefit but never had to be tested on the defense side. 18 It can
potentially be used as a rationale for why we need to fix the border. So that it
can be effectively policed. These are not trade-off issues. They are
reinforcing issues. So what are the next steps?
NEXT STEPS
I would suggest that we have to recognize this Homeland Security
Agenda is something that the U.S, but clearly something North America
overall has to come to grips with. I try to say to North American
audiences, homeland security is not going to be achieved at home. These are
global networks that the bad guys try to target, networks of transportation,
networks of finance, energy, information and of labor. Trying to protect one
node of those networks is like hiring a network security manager who says "I
am just going to protect the server next to my desk. It is convenient. I do not
have any resources. I cannot get out to those other servers." What is at the
heart of our prosperity as a trading nation amongst the first world trading
their inability to legally reach the interior of Mexico, and their inspection and clearance on the
U.S. side of the border by Mexican customs brokers all work together to create a large demand
for warehousing and freight-forwarding in this city." ld.
18 National Defense Highway System available at www.globalsecurity.org/
military/facility/ndhs.htm;
The
Interstate
Highway
System,
available
at
www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/highway.htm
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nations is sustaining a global network that makes it possible for commerce to
move readily. This is more than a U.S. issue and it is more than a North
American issue. It is a global network issue. It is a global public policy
challenge.
I would suggest that what we need to be thinking about is how do we
build layers of security in these networks. It is critical to our prosperity, but
that is only going to be achieved by taking a multilateral approach to that
design. Where can we pilot innovative solutions? Why not do it within the
most robust trade relationships on the planet and illustrate what has to
happen ultimately in a broader international scale right here where we are
most forward in our development and build on prior initiatives to 9-11, build
on the smart border accords to push it much further.
The next step I would suggest on container security is not taking the "P"
word, the perimeter approach, but ultimately acknowledging these things
originate from far away places. We have to build safeguards from the point
of origin through this whole system and be able to filter the bad from the
good. There has to be adult supervision, essentially, in these global
networks. The mantra of the 1990's was, that would be counterproductive
because of the risk that adversaries will exploit these or target them and
cause disruption.
One initiative I have been very heavily involved with is Operation Safe
Commerce.' 9 This is an illustration of the kind of approach that needs to be
taken. This started as a container security effort originating in northern New
England. It involves one company, Osram Sylvania,20 which makes light
bulbs in Slovakia. They volunteered to do two things. They opened their
books to show us how they actually get the box from Slovakia to a
distribution plant in New Hampshire. They essentially said to us "What do
you think from a security standpoint? We are going to show you what we
have got here. We have some data. Also, if there is a tool that you think we
could use or want to test that will bring security to at least a portion of the
supply chain, we will be a guinea pig for you." They agreed in this one test
to basically allow us to take a look at how a shipment goes from Slovakia
through the Czech Republic to Hamburg to Montreal across the Vermont
border into New Hampshire. Secondly, when the test ran we wanted to track
19 Operation Safe Commerce is a federally funded program designed to identify and

fund business initiatives to improve security for the movement of cargo through the supply
chain. 67 FED. REG., No. 224, Notices, Nov. 20, 2002, Department of Transportation,
Transportation Security Administration, Docket No. TSA-2002-13827, available at
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/
20 Operation Safe Commerce Announces Completion of Phase One Testing of Cargo
Container Security Initiative, Press Release, OSRAM SYLVANIA, June 14, 2002,
availableat www.sylvania.com/press/06142002.html
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the containers and see if anybody messed with it. We wanted to gather this
information along the entire route.
One test involved a GPS antenna outside the door of the container with a
wire that went inside to a car battery with a bunch of other stuff. When the
engineers presented this to the team that was overseeing the project they
asked, "Have you talked to the customs' agents along the five international
borders you must cross to tell them you are doing this experiment, because if
they see the funky antenna with the wire in it, they might have some ideas."
The engineers said, "Nobody told us or paid us to do consulting work with
custom folks. You want to track the box. We told you how to track the box."
They did not have enough time to sort out the issue. Let's see what happens.
It sailed across all five international border crossings, including the United
States, without anyone saying, "What is with the funky antenna with the
wire?" This was the ultimate trusted shipper, but we did find a few things
along the way. There were very little controls. The other sort of humorous
story of this project was that the truck driver took 12 hours to get from Montreal to New Hampshire. It should have taken him about three hours. He
trekked through the red light district in Montreal, and then slept it off at the
Vermont border. Twenty million boxes traveling on this planet and he had
the one that was being monitored by the U.S. government. But it speaks to
the potential vulnerability, does it not?
The key is how do you manage this? It sounds a little overwhelming
initially, but I suggest a Phase Two proposal if Canada engages on recruiting
another eight supply chains through the Canadian ports of Halifax and
Montreal to get more data, test out more processes or data changes that can
bring transparency and accountability to the system. We can get to where we
need to be in this regard.
Why is transparency and accountability so vital? I would say because you
cannot do risk management without it. Transparency and accountability give
you three critical things. One is when you have intelligence; it becomes
actionable without causing mass disruption to the system. Lets say we had a
CIA operative inside Al Queda today who was in Karachi and watched a
chemical weapon being loaded in a box and put on a lorry that was sent down
to the Port of Karachi. This hard intelligence is beamed back to Langley and
the President convenes his national security teams. He turns to Tom Ridge
and says, "Where is the box?" Governor Ridge has to say, "Well sir, it could
be coming into Vancouver, or Seattle/Tacoma, or Oakland/San Francisco, or
L.A./Long Beach, or coming through the canal in any of our gulf or east
coast ports. But we will be on the lookout for it." The incoming disruption
from not having the ability to act on that intelligence would be tremendous.
We cannot even find ships right now. I grew up in the Coast Guard, search
and rescue, where we had to search for people who want to be found and I
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can tell you, this is not easy stuff. Having the means to be able to do that in
the modern age gives you that want.
Secondly, we are not going to have a whole lot of intelligence. So how
do you do this? You do this by patent recognition and anomaly detection.
You find bad guys; known bad guys trying to blend in like they did in 9-11.
The key here is that they usually do not get things quite right. They ship
things on the wrong day. They say here is 15 tons of furniture. Unless it is
stainless steel, they cannot fit that much furniture in a 40 x 8 foot box. They
fish where there are no fish. They take a ferryboat where there is no ferry
run. Those are the kinds of things that jump out. By having transparency you
can pick up that intelligence. You know where you can assign risk and you
have a better availability to evaluate low risk.
The final thing critical for risk management in counter-terrorism is the
ability to do forensics (How did it happen?) quickly. Because, if we cannot
do that then terrorism creates what can become a debilitating public
confidence issue. Where did the box come from? If we can immediately
identify that the wayward box came from Karachi, took this funky route and
then arrived here in LA, we would not have to close down the Ambassador
Bridge delaying interfirm GM Parts. However, if it is just a box we cannot
figure out much about it. The paper trail is like a Sherlock Holmes mystery
you have to read through to resolve the issue. If that is the case, then we have
a problem.
If every time a plane fell out of sky the Federal Government and the
Aviation Commission shrugged and stated it does not happen too often, the
only people that would be flying would be barn-stormers. What do we do?
We built in black boxes, the flight data recorder. We took this step precisely
because we have to answer that question quickly. The industry is perceived
as making safety an organic part of how they run their industry. From the
design to every time we get on, we are instructed how to put a seat belt on.
Through every bit of the life of aviation, safety is viewed as being an organic
part of that process.
CONCLUSION
This is serious business we are engaged in here over the next three days.
As nations, we must step up to this agenda and get out of what I call a
liability mitigation approach to security. Everybody doing just enough so that
when it happens next time they would not get hung is essentially how we are
approaching so much of this. I am afraid that this is not a trade-off issue.
Efficiencies and securities if designed right are mutually reinforcing. They
must be mutually reinforcing. There are some next steps that we should and
must take very quickly to move us beyond the smart border accord. Thank
you very much.

